This paper studies how borrowers with different levels of default risk would self-select Ž . Ž . between fixed rate mortgages FRMs and adjustable rate mortgages ARMs . We show that under asymmetric information, where the risk type of a borrower is private information to the borrower and not known by the lender, the unique equilibrium may be Ž . a separating equilibrium in which the high-risk low-risk borrowers choose ARMs Ž . FRM's . Thus, the borrower's mortgage choice will serve as a signal of default risk, enabling lenders to screen high-risk and low-risk borrowers. It is possible for the separating equilibrium to yield positive economic profits for lenders in a competitive market. It is also possible to have a unique pooling equilibrium where all borrowers choose either FRMs or ARMs. The model implies that an increase in the proportion of high risks will increase the likelihood of a separating equilibrium where both mortgage types are offered. Also, a uniform downward shift in the expected change in the interest rate or an increase in borrowers' current or future incomes make ARMs more attractive for both types of borrowers. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION
Ž . During the 1980s adjustable rate mortgages ARMs emerged as an alterna-Ž . tive to traditional fixed rate mortgages FRMs . The market share of ARMs for conventional mortgages exceeded 20% each year between 1985 and 1995, with a high of 58% in 1988. The persistence of these two primary mortgage types raises the question of how borrowers choose between ARMs and FRMs.
This question has been addressed in a number of theoretical studies. Brueckw x ner 7 argues that the expected mobility of the borrower is a determining factor in the choice of mortgage type. When a borrower moves, srhe sells the property and prepays the mortgage. As a result, more mobile borrowers favor ARMs because the lower initial rates of ARMs guarantee them lower payments w x over a short loan life. Brueckner 8 also shows that if interest rates are expected to increase, ARMs may be preferred by borrowers with high discount rates who expect an increasing income stream. Such borrowers prefer low payments in initial years and the expected payment stream under an ARM w x matches their income stream better than under an FRM. Baesel and Biger 4 use capital market theory to study how the characteristics of the borrowers' future income stream and inflation uncertainty determine the borrowers' choice between a fixed versus an index-linked mortgage. The worry for the borrowers in their model is the variance in their net wealth, i.e., their income less their w x mortgage payments. Although in Baesel and Biger 4 the borrowers are subject to inflation risk, they face no default risk. It is concluded that borrowers will prefer an index-linked mortgage over an FRM if their future income is either fixed or stochastically independent of inflation. 1 In this paper, we examine another factor which may have an impact on the mortgage choice of borrowers, that is, default risk. Our primary purpose is to see how borrowers with different levels of default risk self-select between FRMs and ARMs and whether the mortgage selection can serve the lenders as a signal of borrowers' default risk. To our knowledge, this is the first theoretical study of the role of borrowers' default risk in their choice between FRM and ARM mortgage contracts.
The question posed in this paper is important for the multi-trillion dollar lending market, 2 and in particular for mortgage lenders and mortgage insurance companies. During the 1992 period, more than 3.5% of commercial mortgages were delinquent and over 17% of outstanding commercial mortgage credit was either delinquent, foreclosed, in the process of foreclosure, or restructured. The incidence of mortgage default and foreclosure in residential markets increased dramatically in the 1980s. Around 19% of the Federal Housing Administration Ž . FHA loans in the 1981᎐1982 period and 17% of the FHA loans in 1984 were foreclosed. 3 It might be argued that default is not a concern for lenders since borrowers are generally required to purchase mortgage insurance if the loan 1 The borrower's mortgage choice under asymmetric information was the focus of a related line w x w x w x of theoretical work also: see Chari and Jagannathan 12 , Dunn and Spatt 15 , Yang 41 , Brueckner w x w x w x 9 , LeRoy 25 , and Stanton and Wallace 35 . These papers, however, do not study how borrowers self-select between FRMs and ARMs. Instead, they focus on borrowers' choice among FRMs with different combinations of coupon rates, points, and prepayment penalties. 2 In 1995, about 3.7 trillion dollars in mortgages and mortgage securities alone were held by a Ž . variety of institutions Freddie Mac, ''Financing Homes for a Diverse America'' . amount exceeds 80% of their property value. 4 However, such insurance does not protect the lender completely against default risk and its associated costs. First, loans with low loan-to-value ratios are not required to have mortgage insurance. Second, even if a loan is insured the insurance payment often covers only a part of the lender's default loss. Furthermore, whether a loan is insured or not and how much coverage the insurance provides affect the sharing of default risk between the lender and the insurance company, but does not diminish the amount of risk. Therefore, understanding the loss exposure of lenders and insurance companies is critical to correctly pricing mortgages and mortgage insurance.
We study the relationship between default risk and mortgage choice in a simple theoretical model with two types of borrowers, high-risk borrowers and low-risk borrowers. High-and low-risk borrowers are differentiated on the basis of their probability of experiencing a drop in future income. The high risks are those with a higher probability of an income drop and thus a higher probability of default, other things being equal. We consider both the case where a borrower's type is private information to the borrower and the case where it is public knowledge. Clearly, factors other than the borrower's income influence default risk, most notably the risk that the property value will fall below the loan balance. Our focus is not on the determinants of default risk, but rather on whether a borrower-specific component of default risk may induce different borrowers to choose different mortgage types. Therefore, we consider the simplest case where the only source of default is the inability of the borrower to make the mortgage payments. In fact, recent empirical evidence by w x Archer, Elmer, Harrison, and Ling 3 suggests that the ability of the borrower to make the mortgage payments may be more important in explaining default Ž than the value of the property relative to the mortgage balance i.e., loan-to-value . ratio .
It will be clear that our analysis can easily be applied to any market that involves a choice problem between a variable rate loan and a fixed rate loan. This includes both residential and commercial mortgages, credit cards, business loans, etc. Given their significant share in the lending industry, we chose residential mortgages as an example to focus on in this paper.
We show that under asymmetric information when the default cost for borrowers is sufficiently high there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which lenders offer both ARMs and FRMs, and high-risk borrowers choose ARMs while low-risk borrowers prefer FRMs. This result indicates that ARM and FRM contract offerings can help the lenders screen high and low default risk borrowers. The separating equilibrium can have either zero profits from both risk types or positive profits from low-risk borrowers and zero profits from high-risk borrowers. We also show that, depending on the default probabilities and borrowers' default disutility, it is possible to have a unique pooling equilibrium where all borrowers choose FRMs or a unique pooling equilibrium where all borrowers choose ARMs. Similarly, under full information we obtain equilibria where both types choose FRMs, both types choose ARMs, or high risks choose ARMs and low risks choose FRMs. However, we obtain separating equilibria under asymmetric information for some cases where only a single mortgage type would have existed under full information. Therefore, informational asymmetries can play an important role in obtaining equilibria where both FRMs and ARMs are chosen by borrowers.
Our model fits into the growing body of research on contracting under asymmetric information. In general, models of asymmetric information in competitive markets can be categorized with respect to which parties move first, the informed parties or the uninformed parties. This difference in the order Ž w x of moves has implications for the equilibrium results see Thakor 36 for an . overview of these models as they apply to finance . In models where the Ž w x w x. informed parties move first e.g., Spence 34 and Leland and Pyle 24 , such as in labor markets where workers obtain a level of education in order to signal their productivity levels to firms, the outcome can be separating, pooling, or multiple Nash equilibria, or no equilibrium. On the other hand, in models where Ž w x the uninformed move first e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz 30 , Jaffee and Russell w x w x w x. 19 , Milde and Riley 27 , and Bester 5 , such as in insurance markets where firms offer policies to consumers without knowing their risk types, the Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is a unique zero-profit separating equilibrium. Models where the uninformed move first are referred to as screening models. Our model fits into this category. However, it differs from standard screening models in an important way. In the latter there is a single product that the firms offer at different quantities for different prices. In our model, firms offer a Ž . single unit of two different products ARMs vs FRMs at different prices. One consequence of this difference is that the separating equilibrium in our model can involve positive profits. Another consequence is that pooling emerges as the unique equilibrium for some parameter conditions. 5 w x Our results can be contrasted with those of Titman 37 and Guedes and w x w x Thompson 18 . Titman's 37 screening model studies how firms with invest-Ž ment opportunities of different risk levels choose between long-term fixed . rate and short-term financing. Firms have private information about their production efficiency. As in our model, he obtains pooling equilibria where 5 w x An exception to the standard screening models is Bester 5 who also obtains a pooling equilibrium outcome. In that model, lenders offer contracts which specify the interest rate and the collateral requirement, while the borrowers choose a loan amount as well as a contract. The driving force behind the existence of the pooling equilibrium is the inability of lenders to specify the loan amount along with the interest rate and collateral requirement when designing contracts. both borrower types choose the same type of loan contract. He also obtains a separating equilibrium, under certain parameter conditions, in which the ''good risks'' choose short-term financing and the ''bad risks'' choose long-term financing. This is in contrast with our separating equilibrium where low risks choose fixed rate and high risks choose adjustable rate loan contracts. In addition to the differences in the nature of the information asymmetry, the key factor influencing these contrasting results is the presence of transaction costs of default in our model and the role of ARMs in reducing the default w x probability for high risks. Guedes and Thompson 18 offer empirical evidence for a signaling model where firms issue either fixed or adjustable rate debt to finance a project. They obtain support for a separating equilibrium where high quality firms issue high default risk debt and low quality firms issue low default risk debt, and the ranking of default risk between two debt types depends on the relative levels of expected real interest rate and inflation volatility. In addition to being a signaling model, their model differs from ours in that the ranking of the default risks of adjustable and fixed rate debt contracts in their model are independent of the quality of the borrower. The impact of borrower type on the relative default risks of the two mortgage types is, in fact, an important determinant of the equilibria in our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2. Zero-profit contracts are discussed in Section 3. The optimal behavior of borrowers is examined in the Section 4. We then analyze the lenders' optimal mortgage offers and the resulting equilibria of the game in Section 5. Section 6 provides a discussion of our results and implications of the model. Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
THE MODEL
Consider a competitive lending market where lenders offer Fixed Rate Ž . Ž . Mortgages FRMs andror Adjustable Rate Mortgages ARMs . The term for Ž all mortgages is two periods. Both mortgages are interest only loans i.e., no . amortization with the loan amount as a balloon payment at the end of the term. The loan amount for each contract is normalized to $1. Therefore, the interest rate will be the same as the payment, and the terms ''interest rate,'' ''interest payment,'' and ''mortgage payment'' will be used interchangeably throughout the paper. The lenders obtain the funds needed for lending by borrowing short Ž . 6 term one year at the spot market rate. It is assumed that lenders are risk neutral while borrowers are risk averse. Each borrower wants to take out a single loan and has a current income of Y at which he qualifies for an ARM or FRM loan. The borrowers, however, differ with respect to their second period income. There are two types of borrowers: Ž . Ž . Type H high-risk borrowers have a higher probability than type L low-risk borrowers of facing a reduction of their income to y, y -Y, in the second period. The probability that a type j borrower experiences a decline in income in the second period is given by p , j s L, H, p ) p . Some of the reasons j H L for a reduction in a borrower's income include loss of job, divorce, and increase in family expenses. Type L borrowers make up portion of the total borrower pool while type H borrowers make up 1 y portion. After making the first-period payments, the borrower has two payments due in the second period. One is the second-period mortgage payment, the other is the principal repayment. We assume that the property value remains constant through time and the loan-to-value ratio is one. Thus, the value of the property will be exactly equal to, and hence sufficient to pay, the principal in Period 2. However, the borrower's second-period income may not be sufficient to pay the mortgage payment for period 2. 7 As a result, the only source of default in the current model is a sufficient drop in the borrower's second-period income.
Ž . Each lender in Period 1 decides which contract s to offer, FRM andror Ž . ARM, and sets the interest rates for the contract s that it offers. The rate at which the lenders can borrow in Period 1 is given by r. The second-period cost of borrowing will be r q , where is a random variable with marginal Ž . Ž . w x density f and cumulative density F on the interval , , where
In the case of FRM, the lender sets the interest rate, i, and this rate remains unchanged in the second period. This rate incorporates expectations about the cost of borrowing in the second period as well as expected default costs. In the case of ARM, the interest rate will fluctuate according to the lender's cost of borrowing in the market. Given the potential default losses the lender adds a margin of ␣ G 0 to the cost of borrowing in each period in order to have nonnegative expected profits. Thus, the first period's ARM interest rate will be r q ␣ while the second period's interest rate will be r q ␣ q . Since is a random draw, the second period ARM rate is unknown at the time the contract is designed.
We restrict our attention to interest rates and parameter values which satisfy r q ␣ q -y -i -Y -r q ␣ q . Note that under this general setting default occurs under an FRM if the borrower's income falls to y but not if it remains at Y. Depending on the realization of , on the other hand, default 7 Technically, there is no beginning or end of a period in the current model. Therefore, the second-period payment as well as the principal are due immediately following the first period. As a result, the fact that the seller can obtain exactly the principal from the sale of the property does not enable him to avoid default unless he can also make the mortgage payment for the second period. This is a simple way of capturing the fact that borrowers generally are unable to sell their property and pay back the principal immediately upon realizing a drop in income and, as a result, have both overdue mortgage payments as well as outstanding principal by the time they are declared to be in default.
under an ARM may occur under two possibilities: the borrower's income falls to y and y is less than the second-period payment or the borrower's income remains at Y but the second-period payment increases above Y. There is also the possibility under an ARM that, even if income falls to y, there will be no default because the ARM rate may fall below y.
ZERO-PROFIT CONTRACTS
Before characterizing the equilibrium under asymmetric information, we first consider the zero-profit FRM and ARM contracts for each type. Developing the zero-profit contracts will be useful later in our equilibrium analysis.
Let i U be the FRM rate that yields the lender zero expected profits when j chosen by a type j borrower, j s H, L. The lender's zero-profit condition for an FRM to a type j borrower is then characterized by
j w x where E is the expected change in the lender's cost of borrowing in the second period and ␦ is the discount factor. 8 In the current period, the lender earns i U y r. The expected earnings in the second period are equal to i U y r j j w x Ž . y E if the borrower's income does not decrease with probability 1 y p . The lender's problem for an ARM is to choose a margin, ␣ G 0, that will be added to the cost of borrowing in each period. The ARM mortgages here are assumed to have no caps on movements in the interest rate. A typical ARM includes caps on interest rate fluctuations between two periods and over the life of the loan. The impact of including caps in the model will be discussed later Ž .
U see Footnote 11 . Let ␣ be the ARM margin that yields the lender zero j expected profits when chosen by a type j borrower, j s H, L. The lender's zero-profit condition for an ARM contract to a type j borrower is then 8 Since the lender finances the mortgage with two $1 short-term loans, the second period loan repayment by the borrower and the lender's loan repayment of $1 to depositors cancel in the second period. This is why the $1 loan repayment by the borrower does not enter the lender's zero profit condition. Also, since the value of the house and the loan value both remain at $1, the house is sold in the second period and the proceeds are used to pay off the loan. This is why neither the proceeds of the sale nor the mortgage repayment are included in the model. characterized by
The first two terms, r q ␣ y r, capture the current period's earnings. In the j Ž . second period, the borrower's income remains at Y with probability 1 y p , borrower's income falls to y then either i the lender receives r q ␣ q if j the interest rate in the second period is low enough that the borrower's payment Ž . Ž. is less than his income third integral term or ii the lender receives only y if Ž . the borrower's contract payment exceeds his income fourth integral term . The Ž . cost of borrowing to the lender in any case is r q the last integral term .
As a benchmark for our equilibrium analysis, it will be useful at this point to introduce the zero-profit ''pooling'' contracts. Let i U be the FRM rate that yields zero expected profits when chosen by both types of borrowers. The
Ž . ⌸ i ; p s 0 where is the proportion of low risks and 1 y is the H proportion of high risks. Similarly, the zero-profit pooling ARM margin,
BORROWER'S PROBLEM
Each borrower chooses the mortgage contract that maximizes his expected utility. All borrowers possess the same state-independent, strictly concave, and increasing utility function U depending on their wealth. Borrowers differ only in their risk of having a decrease in their income. If the borrower's income in the second period falls below his payment, then he fails to make the full second-period payment and suffers the default disutility of D ) 0. Default disutility captures social and psychic effects of default and damage to the borrower's credit rating, as well as the transaction costs of default. For simplicity, D will be independent of the amount due at the time of default.
The expected utility of a borrower type j, j s H, L, from an FRM is given by
Ž . Ž . If the borrower type j, j s H, L, chooses an ARM, then his expected utility is given by
The first term reflects that the borrower makes the payment r q ␣ out of his income Y in the first period. 10 In the second period, the payment amount changes to r q ␣ q . The borrower's second-period income remains at Y Ž . with probability 1 y p in which case the borrower makes the payment if it is j Ž . less than his income second term , or defaults if the contract payment exceeds Ž . his income third term . The borrower's second-period income falls to y with probability p in which case the borrower makes the payment if it is less than j Ž . his income fourth term or defaults if the payment amount exceeds his income Ž . fifth term . 9 The utility function U represents the borrower's utility in the state of the world in which he owns the house. The utility of home ownership itself is assumed to be a constant and separable Ž from the utility of income, and thus is suppressed in the borrower's problem adding a constant to . borrower's utility will not affect his choice of mortgage . This is consistent with our assumption Ž . that the disutility of default, D, is subtracted from U 0 in the case of default. 10 It is assumed that Y G r q ␣ so that the borrower's current income is sufficient to make the current period's payment; otherwise, the borrower would not qualify for the loan.
Ž .
Ž . Equations 3 and 4 illustrate the trade off for a borrower between an FRM and ARM contract. On one hand, an FRM involves no interest raterpayment uncertainty for the borrower. Furthermore, if the borrower's income does not fall in the second period there will be no default under an FRM since the interest rate remains fixed, while default may occur under the high realizations of the ARM rate. On the other hand, if the borrower's income falls below the FRM mortgage payment, the FRM leads to default while such a drop in income may or may not lead to default under an ARM, depending on the realization of the ARM rate vis-a-vis the income y.
The borrower's choice between an ARM and FRM depends on his risk type. Ž . To see this, we define ⌬V i, ␣ ; p as the difference between a borrower's utility from an FRM and his utility from an ARM contract for given i, ␣, and Ž . Ž . p. Taking the difference between 3 and 4 yields
where F is the cumulative density function for . Note that the probability of default under an FRM is p, while the probability of default under an ARM is
. these default probabilities is multiplied by the disutility of default, ␦ U 0 y D , Ž . in the last term in 5 .
We next examine how the utility differential between FRM and ARM varies Ž . with the borrower's risk type. For this we differentiate ⌬V i, ␣ ; p with respect to p:
According to Remark 1, as p increases the probability of default under FRM increases by more than the probability of default under ARM increases. This establishes an important feature of our model: If the borrower's disutility of default is large enough, then when compared to FRMs, high-risk borrowers find ARMs more attractive than low-risk borrowers do. Consequently, for suffi-Ž . ciently large D, the utility differential in 5 may be positive for low risks and negative for high risks, but not the other way around.
The difference in the relative preferences for ARM and FRM of the two borrower types may seem counterintuitive at first. With risk-averse borrowers, one might expect high risks to be more reluctant to assume the additional risk associated with interest rate variability under an ARM than low risks. But in this model there is no perfect link between the probability of an adverse income shock and the probability of default with an ARM. Relative to an FRM, an ARM has an additional cost associated with the high income state, the cost of potentially defaulting if rates are high; and an ARM has an additional benefit associated with the low income state, the benefit of potentially avoiding default if rates are low. Low risks are more likely to suffer the additional cost and less likely to obtain the additional benefit of an ARM, and are therefore, more likely to prefer an FRM. This result will play an important role in characterizing the equilibrium. 12 As expected, the utility differential between an FRM and ARM decreases Ž . with the FRM rate and increases with the ARM rate, Ѩ ⌬V i, ␣ ; p rѨ i -0 Ž . and Ѩ ⌬V i, ␣ ; p rѨ␣ ) 0. We next characterize a borrower's indifference Ž . function between i and ␣. Fixing the utility differential at ⌬V i, ␣ ; p s 0, Ž . the indifference function defines the FRM rate, i ␣ ; p , at which the borrower of type p is indifferent between an FRM and an ARM for a given margin ␣.
Ž . Implicit differentiation of ⌬V i, ␣ ; p s 0 yields upward sloping indifference functions,
Ž . Ž . The fact that 6 is strictly negative indicates that in the risk type, utility space the utility function from an FRM crosses the utility function from an ARM once at most. This parallels the single crossing property in standard screening models. 12 As mentioned earlier, we have assumed that there are no caps on the ARM rate. Including a cap would have two opposing effects on the relative preference for ARM versus FRM. On one hand, a cap would reduce the probability of default when income remains high, making an ARM more attractive. On the other hand, a cap would increase the ARM zero profit margin, increasing the probability of default when income is low, making an ARM less attractive. Therefore, the net effect on the utility differential between an ARM and FRM would be ambiguous. However, the sign Ž . of Eq. 6 would remain unchanged; high risk borrowers would always like ARMs more than low risks would. Therefore, inclusion of caps would not impact our analysis. For a more detailed w x analysis of interest rate caps for ARMs, see Brueckner 6 .
FIG. 1. Separating equilibrium with zero expected profits.
An important consideration is how the indifference functions of the two borrower types and, therefore, their preferences between an ARM and FRM differ from each other.
Proof. See the Appendix. any given ␣. Figure 1 illustrates the representative indifference functions for the two types for D sufficiently large. 13 According to Figure 1 , a borrower Ž . prefers an ARM over an FRM if the i, ␣ contract combinations offered by the 13 Note that the indifference functions depicted in Fig. 1 lenders lie above the borrower's indifference line. Otherwise, the borrower chooses an FRM over an ARM. Therefore, if lenders' contract offers lie above Ž . below both borrower types' indifference functions, both borrower types prefer Ž . ARMs FRMs , and if lenders' contract offers lie between the high-risk and low-risk borrowers' indifference functions, high risks prefer ARMs while low risks prefer FRMs. Note that Remark 1 and Proposition 1 eliminate the possibility of low risks preferring ARMs while high risks prefer FRMs.
EQUILIBRIA
Having defined the zero-profit contracts and borrowers' choice problems, we can now characterize the equilibrium under full information and asymmetric information. We define equilibrium as a set of mortgage contracts such that when each borrower chooses the contract that maximizes his expected utility no equilibrium mortgage contract yields negative expected profits for the lenders and no lender has an incentive to offer contracts outside the equilibrium set. We consider only pure strategy Nash equilibria.
The lender's problem under full information is simple. Since lenders can observe each borrower's risk type and since they operate in a competitive market, each lender in equilibrium offers a different zero-profit ARM and zero-profit FRM rate for each borrower type. These contracts have been Ž . Ž . characterized in Eqs. 1 and 2 .
Under asymmetric information, the type of borrower is private information to the borrower and not known by the lender. Thus, the lender cannot offer a loan contract contingent on the borrower's type. Since a lender cannot discriminate among borrowers according to their type, each borrower faces the same mortgage rate offers by the lender.
14 As a result, the equilibrium under asymmetric information will be one of two kinds, a pooling equilibrium where all borrowers obtain the same mortgage type at the same rate or a separating equilibrium where one group of borrowers obtains ARMs while the other group obtains FRMs. We assume default costs are large enough to satisfy the requirement in Proposition 1, implying that the low risks' indifference function Ž . will always lie above the high risks' indifference function in i, ␣ space.
14 If there were a single lender, then that lender could price its ARM and FRM offers such that each mortgage would be chosen by the borrower type that it was intended for. However, the lender's problem is complicated by the actions of other lenders in the market. Suppose a lender, say Lender A, offers a mortgage type which is profitable only when purchased by low-risk borrowers. As long as some other lenders offer a mortgage that is preferred by the high-risk borrowers, Lender A will earn positive profits. If, however, other lenders do not offer such a mortgage, then high-risk borrowers might purchase the mortgage offered by Lender A. This, in turn, would affect Lender A's profits adversely and might cause the lender to change or discontinue its offer. Thus, a lender needs to consider not only the borrowers' preferences, but also the strategies of other lenders in the market.
We now present the equilibria and their necessary and sufficient conditions. Since these conditions are mutually exclusive, each of the equilibria in Propositions 2᎐4 below is unique. 
is above the high risk indifference function, and since
indifference function. Therefore, if such a contract pair is offered, high risks will choose the ARM and low risks will choose the FRM and lenders will make zero profits from each borrower type. In Fig. 1 U Ž FRM rate which will attract both borrower types is less than i which is less L U . than the zero profit pooling FRM rate i . As a result, no lender can offer an FRM which will attract both borrower types and earn nonnegative profits. So if 
, attract both borrower types, and earn positive profits. 1 Therefore, if there exists a separating equilibrium where high risks obtain an ARM with margin ␣ U , low risks obtain an FRM with rate i U , and lenders earn 
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the proof of Proposition 3 can be seen by referring to Fig. 2 . This equilibrium is similar to the one in Proposition 2 except for the FRM rate and the existence of positive expected profits from the low risk to negative. Similarly, no pooling ARM equilibrium can exist for reasons identical to those in the proof of Proposition 2. The separating equilibria in Propositions 2 and 3 are the only separating equilibria which can occur. In both cases, high risks obtain ARMs while low risks obtain FRMs. The reason for this is the following. Compared to an FRM, an ARM has an additional cost and an additional benefit. The additional cost is the possibility of defaulting even when income is high. The additional benefit is the possibility of not defaulting even when income is low. Since high risks are more likely to have low income in the second period, they are more likely to enjoy the additional benefit of the ARM than low risks and less likely to suffer the additional cost. At any given pair of ARM and FRM rates, it is less costly for a low risk to obtain an FRM than it is for a high risk. This is why an FRM can be used as a screening device and low risks would choose it to signal their type.
Unlike the equilibrium in Proposition 2, the FRM rate in the equilibrium of Proposition 3 is above the low risk zero-profit rate, and lenders enjoy positive profits. How can such profits be sustained in a competitive environment? By Ž U . definition, i ␣ ; p is the lowest FRM rate at which high risks will not The equilibrium contracts of Propositions 2 and 3 can be compared to those Ž . which would result under full information i.e., to the first best . The high risks in both cases obtain the same contract that they would obtain under full
information the equilibrium contract for low risks would be an FRM at their zero profit rate, the same as under asymmetric information, so that the separating equilibrium would be first best. If, on the other hand,
full information equilibrium contract for the low risks would be an ARM at their zero profit margin. In Proposition 3, the low risks in the separating equilibrium with positive expected profits are never at the first best. If an ARM at their zero profit margin. If both high and low risks preferred ARMs under full information, what might motivate a low risk to choose FRMs while high risks choose ARMs under asymmetric information? Under full information, each risk type would obtain an ARM at their own zero-profit rate. When we move to asymmetric information, if both types were to obtain an ARM it would be at the pooling rate, which would make high risks better off and low risks worse off. As a result, low risks may face a lower default probability under an FRM at the equilibrium rate than under the pooling ARM rate. Thus, they may find it worthwhile to incur the signaling costs associated with obtaining an FRM rather than an ARM. On the other hand, high risks may not find it in their interest to mimic low risks. Due to their higher probability of having a drop in income, high risks value, more than low risks, the possibility under ARM of avoiding default when income is low. Therefore, high risks may opt for an ARM at their own zero-profit rate rather than mimicking low risks to obtain an FRM at the equilibrium rate.
Note that our separating equilibria can only be obtained under the condition Ž . that at least high risks and possibly both risk types would prefer ARM's under Ž full information. If the only source of risk were interest rate risk with no . possibility of default or with zero default costs , FRM's would be superior from a risk-sharing perspective and would be preferred by both types, so no ARM's would be observed. This means that for either type of borrower to prefer an ARM it must offer a lower probability of default than an FRM and default must be costly. A borrower will prefer an ARM to an FRM if the interest-rate᎐risk-sharing advantage of the FRM is outweighed by the ARM's benefit of reducing the risk of default and its subsequent costs.
If the parameter conditions are such that neither of the separating equilibria exist, one of two possible pooling equilibria may result. Under the pooling equilibria lenders cannot distinguish between high risks and low risks and a single mortgage contract type at a single rate exists.
PROPOSITION 4. There exists a pooling FRM equilibrium under asymmetric
U U Ž U . U Ž U .
information with rate i if and only if i -i ␣ ; p and i
-i ␣ ; p and L H H U U Ž U .
a pooling ARM equilibrium with rate ␣ if and only if i
The conditions for the pooling FRM equilibrium are illustrated in Fig. 3 . Note in Fig. 3 
that if an FRM at i
U is offered, ␣ is the greatest ARM margin 3 which will attract both borrower types away from the pooling FRM and ␣ is the greatest ARM margin which will attract only high risk borrowers. But the parameter conditions in the proposition imply that ␣ is below the pooling 3 ARM rate, ␣ U , which is necessary to obtain nonnegative profits if both types choose it, and ␣ is below the high risk zero expected profit ARM margin, ␣ U .
H
Therefore, no ARM contract can attract borrowers away from the pooling FRM without earning negative profits. The conditions for the pooling ARM equilibrium are illustrated in Fig. 4 . If only an ARM contract is offered at margin ␣ U , then in order to attract borrowers away from this contract an FRM at a rate below the low risk zero profit rate must be offered. Therefore, no lender will have an incentive to offer such a contract and the equilibrium contract will be a pooling ARM.
Although the necessary and sufficient conditions in Propositions 2᎐4 are mutually exclusive, they are not all inclusive. Therefore, there remain some parameter conditions which are not represented in these three propositions and Ž which lead to the nonexistence of an equilibrium e.g., no equilibrium exists if
. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Comparison of Equilibria
An important conclusion of the analysis is that under certain parameter conditions borrowers will be separated between FRMs and ARMs according to their risk type. Thus, the mortgage choice of a borrower serves as a signal to the lender about the risk type of that borrower. Another result of particular interest is that a pooling equilibrium is possible under asymmetric information.
w x This is in contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz 30 and other similar screening models where it is impossible to obtain a pooling equilibrium. The reason behind their result is that a firm always has an incentive and the ability to break a pooling equilibrium by offering a contract that attracts low-risk customers only. This is not the case under the parameter conditions of Proposition 4 in our model, either because the lender cannot attract low-risk borrowers without offering below zero profit rates or because if a lender can lower its rate to attract low-risk borrowers, it ends up attracting high risks as well as low risks and earns negative expected profits.
The other interesting equilibrium outcome arises in Proposition 3 where the low risks purchase an FRM contract at a rate above their zero profit rate. Consequently, the lenders earn positive expected profits from the low-risk w x borrowers. This is also in contrast to the result of Rothschild and Stiglitz 30 and other screening models where the equilibrium is always characterized by zero expected profits. w x These two departures from the results of Rothschild and Stiglitz 30 and other screening models are due to the fact that the firms in these models have a Ž continuum of contract types to choose from e.g., a continuum of coverage . levels that insurance companies can offer whereas the lenders in our model have two contract types to offer, ARM and FRM. Such discontinuity in contract Ž . types restricts a deviating firm's flexibility and gives rise to the possibility where no firm can break a pooling equilibrium and where positive expected surplus from low risks survives in a separating equilibrium.
The nature of the cost incurred by low risks to signal their type in the w x separating equilibria differs from that in Rothschild and Stiglitz 30 as well. w x Since consumers are risk averse in Rothschild and Stiglitz 30 , they desire to purchase full-insurance coverage at the zero profit premium; but the low-risk consumers in the separating equilibrium receive partial coverage while the high risks receive full coverage. In the mortgage market, the type of signaling cost depends upon the type of separating equilibrium, zero expected profit or positive expected profit, as well as the type of equilibrium contract low risks would have obtained under full information. In any separating equilibrium under asymmetric information, the low risks obtain an FRM. So for the equilibria in Propositions 2 and 3, if the low risks would have obtained an ARM under full information, the signaling cost is the utility differential Ž between a zero profit ARM for low risks and the resulting FRM either zero . profit or positive profit . If the low risks would have obtained an FRM under full information, then there is no signaling cost in the zero expected profit equilibrium of Proposition 2, but under the positive expected profit equilibrium of Proposition 3 there is a signaling cost because low risks obtain FRMs above their zero-profit rate. Although low-risk consumers in Rothschild and Stiglitz incur a signaling cost by receiving less than full coverage, these signaling costs are dissipative in that low-cost consumers pay a zero profit rate for the coverage they receive. In our model, signaling costs are also dissipative except for the case of Proposition 3 in which low risks pay an FRM rate above their zero-profit FRM rate.
The Role of Default Costs
Ž . Transaction costs of default to the borrower D in our model have been the center of debate in option-based models of default pricing. One set of studies makes use of a contingent claims model and treats default as the exercise of a Ž w x. put option e.g., Kau et al. 21᎐23 . This approach assumes ''ruthless'' default; borrowers exercise the default option immediately upon the value of the property falling below the mortgage's value. Another line of research treats transaction costs as being critical and argues that even when the default option is in-the-money, the borrower may prefer not to exercise it in order to avoid the Ž w x w x disutility of default e.g., Foster and Van Order 17 , Titman and Torous 38 , w x. and Riddiough and Thompson 29 .
Our concern here is not about the borrower's decision of whether or not to default or the pricing of the default option. The relevant question for us is how critical default disutility is for the borrower's choice between FRM and ARM contracts. As indicated above, having positive default costs is a necessary condition for ARM's to exist in our model. If default costs were zero, the risk aversion of the borrowers and risk neutrality of the lenders would make FRM's the dominant contract type. Although the magnitude of default costs is an important factor in the borrower's choice problem in our model, its significance depends on an additional factor, the probability of a negative income shock Ž Ž . . this can be shown by differentiating 5 with respect to D . A comparison of the raw data for default rates of ARMs and FRMs between 1991 and 1997 shows that ARMs consistently had a higher default rate Ž w x. Mortgage Information Corporation 28 . Similarly, an empirical study by w x Sa-Aadu 31 finds higher default rates on ARMs relative to FRMs. On the other hand, using simulations to measure default risk under alternative mortw x gage instruments, Vandell 39 concludes that variable rate mortgages compare favorably to the fixed rate mortgages in expected default loss. w x The results of Sa-Aadu 31 appear to be in line with our separating Ž . equilibrium outcome Propositions 2 and 3 where riskier borrowers choose ARM over FRM. We should note, however, that although high risks choose ARMs in our separating equilibrium, this does not necessarily mean a higher default rate for ARMs. In fact, for high risks, the ARM involves a lower probability of default than the FRM. Therefore, whether the FRM default probability for low risks is greater or less than the ARM default probability for high risks is unclear. Thus, although high risks choose ARMs in the separating equilibrium, the net effect on observed default probabilities is ambiguous.
Implications of the Model
The complicated nature of the model does not allow us to solve for explicit solutions for the equilibrium values of FRM and ARM rates. However, we can still infer the following from the model.
A uniform downward shift in the expected change in the interest rate from Period 1 to Period 2 would make ARMs more attractive for both types of borrowers. This can be related to the high interest rate periods of the 1980s. During these periods the expectation was for interest rates to fall, and ARMs experienced increased market shares. It should be pointed out that high risks still would like ARMs more than low risks would. 15 15 We also considered the impact of a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of . Provided that our parameter condition y -i -Y is satisfied, a mean-preserving spread will not affect the default probability under an FRM. Compared to an FRM, an ARM has both a cost and a benefit. For any given ␣ , a mean-preserving spread will have a nondecreasing impact on the probability of default when second period income is high and a nonincreasing impact on the probability of default Ž . Ž when second period income is low. Although this will make Eq. 6 in the paper more negative i.e., . it will broaden the gap between low risks' and high risks' preferences for ARMs vs. FRMs , its Ž . Ž impact on Eq. 5 is ambiguous i.e., it is unclear whether either type will find ARMs more or less . attractive than FRMs . Furthermore, a mean-preserving spread will alter the equilibrium ␣ as well. Therefore, we are unable to predict the impact of this type of increase in volatility on borrowers' mortgage contract choice in our model. An increase in r would increase both the current and expected future cost of borrowing. In this case, the FRM᎐ARM utility differential would become bigger, implying that FRMs would become more attractive for both borrower types when high current interest rates are not accompanied by an expectation that rates will fall. Similarly, a decrease in r would make ARMs more attractive.
An income shock to the economy that increases borrowers' current income andror decreases the amount of a possible drop in their future income would make ARMs more attractive for both borrower types. The reason is that an increase in current andror future income would reduce the probability of default under ARMs while not affecting the probability of default under FRMs, thus narrowing the utility differential between the two contract types.
An increase in the proportion of low risks can never move the equilibrium from pooling to separating, but it can move the equilibrium from separating to pooling. This is because an increase in the proportion of low risks decreases the pooling equilibrium values for FRMs and ARMs, but does not change the separating equilibrium values. Conversely, a decrease in the proportion of low risks can move the equilibrium from pooling to separating but cannot move the equilibrium from separating to pooling.
We know that as the probability of a negative income shock increases, an ARM becomes more attractive relative to an FRM. Therefore, if p and p are 
L H
We also consider the implications of relaxing the assumption of the model that the only source of income fluctuation is the idiosyncratic risk of borrowers. A potential additional source of income variability is that borrowers' incomes may change due to inflationrdeflation which would also be correlated with interest rates. We have analyzed the model with the assumption that second period incomes are correlated with interest rates. We have found that as long as a change in interest rates leads to a bigger change in mortgage payments than in income, the qualitative results of our paper hold. Although the interest rates at which borrowers default will change, both for high and low income, high risk borrowers prefer ARMs more than low risk borrowers do. Similarly, all of our other results will continue to hold although the parameter values for which they hold will differ from the case where there is no correlation between interest rates and incomes.
Finally, it should be noted that the results of our model hold for both risk averse and risk neutral borrowers. We utilized the standard concave utility function for borrowers to emphasize the fact that ARM's could exist in our model even with risk averse borrowers.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Default risk is an issue of critical importance to lenders. Failure to diagnose and correctly price such a risk can lead to significant losses and missed opportunities. In offering and pricing different mortgage contracts, it is crucial for lenders to know the risk types of the borrowers that each contract would attract at the stated prices.
In this paper we examine how borrowers with different risk types would self-select between fixed and adjustable rate mortgages. We show that there exists a separating equilibrium in which high-risk borrowers choose ARMs while low-risk borrowers prefer FRMs, indicating that ARM and FRM contract offerings can help the lenders screen high-risk and low-risk borrowers. We also show that, depending on the borrowers' risk levels and disutility of default, it is possible to have a pooling equilibrium where all borrowers choose FRMs or a pooling equilibrium where all borrowers choose ARMs. Furthermore, there exist parameter conditions under which no equilibrium exists. We note two deviations of our results from those of standard screening models. One is that there is an equilibrium in our model which involves positive profits from the mortgage contract chosen by low-risk borrowers. The other is that pooling emerges as the unique equilibrium for some parameter conditions of our model. This paper has demonstrated that a borrower's default risk can influence his mortgage choice, and therefore a borrower's mortgage choice can serve as a signal of his default risk. However, this is not to say that default risk is the only determinant of a borrower's mortgage choice. Other factors, such as the expected mobility of the borrower and the market value of the property vis-a-vis the loan balance, also influence the borrower's mortgage choice. Á potential extension of the paper would be to incorporate these other factors and examine any interactions among them. . highest FRM rate which will attract low risks from a pooling ARM , then no firm can deviate and offer an FRM which will attract low risk borrowers without making negative profits. Since i U ) i U , no firm can earn nonnegative 
